Kjetil K. HaugenA and Pavel PopelaB
AFaculty of Logistics, Molde University College, Specialized University in Logistics, Molde, Norway
BFaculty of Mechanical Engineering, Brno University of Technology, Brno, Czech Republic
In this article, we present further discussion provoking explanation, why the existing fight against doping in sport is not fully successful although widely presented in media. Our paper is based on economical arguments derived from discussions of practitioners due to lack of statistically valid data and their fundamental mathematical modeling. Hence, the maximization of a (two-variable) sports attendance demand function, depending on athletes’ performance and doping prevalence, may result in a positive optimal doping prevalence and explain the existing sport doping related situation. Given reasonable assumptions on relevant functional behavior, this result can be interpreted as an incentive for sports officials to allow (and even welcome) some doping. As a consequence, we conclude that one should not be surprised that doping exists and is widespread under the assumption of aggregated rational behavior that is common in economical research. Therefore, the need for a global coordinated system of testing and sanctions decoupled from sport may be a necessary condition in order to meet these challenges and together with the proposed model should be the subject of further discussions.
Keywords: Performance-enhancing drugs, Optimal level of doping, Sports performance, Sports demand
di Giuseppe Ingrassia*
Estratto dell'elaborato di tesi dal titolo “National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA): uno studio di diritto antitrust. L'amateurism come fenomeno di pratiche monopolistiche?”, esposta in data 27 Luglio 2015 presso l'Università degli Studi di Palermo.
*Dottore magistrale in Management dello sport e delle attività motorie. Università degli Studi di Palermo
1. Introduzione; – 2. Dalla nascita del dilettantismo allo sport interuniversitario; – 3. La National Collegiate Athletic Association e le sue norme; – 4. Accenni sulla normativa antitrust nord-americana; – 5. L’NCAA: organizzazione come un cartello e violazioni antitrust; – 6. Conclusioni.